

Rolling Situational Report

Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Gaza Strip, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank, Yemen - Regional: Continue abiding by official directives and relevant embassy warnings across the Middle East through 9th April despite ceasefire

Summary

BAHRAIN, CYPRUS, EGYPT, GAZA STRIP, IRAN, IRAQ, ISRAEL, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, TURKEY, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, WEST BANK, YEMEN

Regional: Continue abiding by official directives and relevant embassy warnings across the Middle East through 9th April despite ceasefire. Continue abiding by official directives and relevant embassy warnings across the Middle East through 9th April, despite the ceasefire. There have been no reports of confirmed Iranian projectiles towards the Gulf or Israel on 9th April. Flight operations from Israel, Syria, Bahrain, and Iraq are set to incrementally resume following airspace reopenings; Bahrain's airspace remains closed. The ceasefire remains precarious, and its trajectory will become clearer following proposed direct Iranian-US negotiations in Pakistan on 11th April. Continue to review shelter-in-place procedures, where necessary.

Incident Status	Local Response Capacity	Last Analyst Update	Analyst Situational Confidence
Active	Some	2026-04-09 17:43 (GMT)	High

Update No.	Trend Rating	Themes/Tags	Incident Tempo
54	Stable	External Conflict, Unrest	Weekly (Thursday)

Developments

Description	Information Credibility	Source Reliability
Ceasefire: Ahead of the Trump-imposed deadline for a deal to be reached between Iran and the US, both sides announced the acceptance of a two-week ceasefire on 8th April.	Confirmed true	Reliable

<p>There have been no verified reports of US-Israeli coalition attacks against Iran since the ceasefire went into effect. However, Iranian state media announced that unspecified “enemies” had launched attacks on the Lavan oil refinery in Hormozgan on 8th April; Israel denies involvement in this alleged attack.</p>	Possibly true	Usually reliable
<p>Iran continued to carry out attacks targeting Gulf countries after the ceasefire went into effect on 8th April. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia announced attacks from Iran on 8th April. There have been no new reports of Iranian projectiles on 9th April.</p>	Probably true	Reliable
<p>Evacuation Watch Level: As disruption persists, organisations have shifted from advising travellers to “shelter in place” toward extracting key personnel for business continuity reasons. The cost, complexity, and risk of moving individuals - especially families - outweighed the benefits of evacuation in the early stages, although as disruption persists and the absence of key personnel begins to affect operations, decisions to move or evacuate are increasingly being driven by business continuity considerations rather than immediate security concerns.</p>	Cannot be judged	Cannot be judged
<p>Healix’s Evacuation Watch Levels are as follows: EVACUATION (Level 4): Iran, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen CONSIDER EVACUATION (Level 3): Bahrain, Gaza, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel WARNING (Level 2): Cyprus, Jordan, Oman, West Bank</p>	Cannot be judged	Cannot be judged
<p>Explanation of Evacuation Watch Levels: For the countries that were raised to ‘Consider Evacuation’ on 6th March, this can be interpreted differently depending on the traveller profile and context. For business travellers, given the credible risk that the operational environment could deteriorate, we advise considering evacuation, as routes may become disrupted at short notice.</p>	Cannot be judged	Cannot be judged
<p>For residents, however, the situation is different. While the decision ultimately depends on individual and organisational risk tolerance, our current assessment is that, despite elevated external conflict risks, the overall security risk rating remains unchanged. Operational conditions largely continue to improve in the region as flight frequencies increase and some governments push for a business-as-usual posture. In this context, evacuation may not be necessary or in the best interest of residents at this time.</p>	Cannot be judged	Cannot be judged

<p>Negotiations: The negotiations are set to formally begin in the morning (local time) on 11th April in Islamabad, Pakistan. However, depending on when the Iranian delegation arrives, talks are reportedly also prepared to take place on 10th April. The talks will take place at the Serena Hotel, adjacent to the Red Zone (government zone). US Vice President JD Vance will lead the US delegation with assistance from Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, while Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi are the most likely candidates from the Iranian side.</p>	Probably true	Usually reliable
<p>The talks will concentrate on Iran's ten-point plan that US President Trump has deemed "workable". Iran's Supreme National Security Council announced on 8th April that talks could continue for up to 15 days.</p>	Confirmed true	Usually reliable
<p>Bahrain: Alleged Iranian attacks resulted in injuries to at least two individuals in the Sitra area, where Bahrain's primary energy infrastructure is located, after debris from intercepted projectiles fell in the vicinity. Flights have also slowly resumed at Bahrain Airport (BAH) on 9th April, following the reopening of airspace; the national carrier, Gulf Air, will gradually begin restarting flights. The airspace had been closed since 28th February.</p>	Probably true	Reliable
<p>Iran: In the days and hours preceding the ceasefire, US-Israeli coalition strikes targeted several petrochemical facilities and industrial sites across Iran. Although the perpetrator remains unconfirmed, Iran's National Oil Refining and Distribution Company reported that unidentified "enemies" attacked the Lavan oil refinery in Hormozgan on 8th April. Aside from the reported incident at Lavan, there have been no additional verified accounts of US-Israeli strikes within Iran. Iran's airspace remains closed as of 9th April.</p>	Possibly true	Usually reliable
<p>There have been mass pro-government rallies and demonstrations held in Tehran, Tabriz, Kerman, Isfahan, and Nazarabad, among other places, on 9th April. The rallies in Tehran have also coincided with the 40-day mourning ceremony for the former Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was assassinated on 28th February.</p>	Confirmed true	Usually reliable
<p>Iraq: Despite Iranian-aligned militant groups also declaring a willingness to cease attacks for two weeks, following the announcement of the ceasefire, there have been several reported attacks. In Iraq, drone attacks against the US Embassy and in the vicinity of the Baghdad Diplomatic Support Centre near Baghdad International Airport (BGW) on 8th April, prompted the US State Department to issue a warning for US citizens. Iraqi airspace reopened on 8th April.</p>	Probably true	Reliable

<p>Kuwait: Kuwait reported several waves of Iranian drones on 8th April, following the implementation of the ceasefire. The 28 launched drones reportedly targeted oil infrastructure and power stations. Material damage was reported from several of the strikes.</p>	Probably true	Reliable
<p>Iran-aligned militant groups in Iraq continued to take credit for attacks on Kuwaiti territory on 8th April.</p>	Confirmed true	Fairly reliable
<p>Kuwait International Airport (KWI) remains closed as of 9th April.</p>	Confirmed true	Reliable
<p>Lebanon: Israel carried out a mass targeting campaign against Hezbollah-linked assets and individuals on 8th April, as part of a military campaign called "Eternal Darkness". Israeli Defence Minister Katz declared this operation to be the "biggest concentrated blow Hezbollah has received" since the pager attack in September 2024. Over 100 locations were struck in a period of ten minutes, countrywide. While reports regarding casualty figures vary, at least 250 fatalities have been confirmed so far.</p>	Probably true	Reliable
<p>Saudi Arabia: Iranian projectiles reportedly targeted the East-West oil pipeline on 8th April, following the announcement of the ceasefire. The IRGC confirmed that it had hit several targets across the Middle East with missiles and drones, including the oil pipeline.</p>	Probably true	Usually reliable
<p>The Saudi Foreign Minister and his Iranian counterpart held a telephone conversation on 9th April.</p>	Confirmed true	Reliable
<p>Syria: Syria's airspace reopened on 8th April.</p>	Confirmed true	Reliable
<p>United Arab Emirates: The UAE announced the interception of several missiles and drones on 8th April following the announcement of the ceasefire. Operations at the Habshan gas complex in Abu Dhabi were temporarily suspended following a fire from intercepted missile debris. Three injuries were also reported.</p>	Probably true	Reliable
<p>Qatar: Seven ballistic missiles and an undisclosed number of drones were reported by Qatari authorities on 8th April. Work to resume LNG production has reportedly started in Qatar following the Iranian attacks on the Ras Laffan and Mesaieed Industrial City facilities in March.</p>	Probably true	Reliable
<p>Israel: Iran reportedly launched three missile salvos at Israel following the announcement of the ceasefire, with impact in southern areas and central/northern areas, including Haifa. Hezbollah in Lebanon had not launched attacks on Israel since the announcement of the ceasefire; however, following Israel's operation in Lebanon (see <i>Lebanon</i>), Hezbollah resumed projectile attacks towards northern areas.</p>	Probably true	Usually reliable

<p>The Transportation Ministry announced that Israel's airspace was fully reopening for normal operations from 00h00 (local time) on 9th April.</p>	<p>Confirmed true</p>	<p>Reliable</p>
<p>Strait of Hormuz: While the two-week ceasefire is contingent on the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, there remains very little maritime traffic. Only six vessels have reportedly passed in just over the past 24 hours. The IRGC outlined that the route vessels must take is to pass Larak Island in order to minimise exposure to naval mines.</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Reliable</p>
<p>Unverified reports indicate that the IRGC is pushing for "no more than 15 vessels to transit the Strait per day" under ceasefire conditions. The announcement declared that the "movement is strictly dependent on Iran's consent and adherence to a specific protocol. This new legal framework, supervised by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, has been officially communicated to the parties in the region. There will be no return to the pre-war status quo."</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Fairly reliable</p>
<p>Description</p>	<p>Confidence</p>	
<p>Hezbollah-Israel: As evidenced in rhetoric since Israel's operation "Eternal Darkness" on 8th April, the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel is, for Israel and the US, distinct from the conflict in Iran. Israeli officials view the renewed fighting with Hezbollah as a continuation of the hostilities that were formally paused by the November 2024 ceasefire.</p>	<p>High</p>	
<p>Israel's naming of the operation, "Eternal Darkness", along with declarations to "remove the threats to northern Israel", indicates that this operation aimed to be a decisive blow to the Iranian-aligned group. Qassem not being assassinated during the attacks is likely to be unfavourable to Israel and its aims to secure its northern border against Hezbollah.</p>	<p>High</p>	
<p>Iran, which views the Israel-Hezbollah conflict as part of its ceasefire understanding with the US, is likely to interpret this development as a violation of the agreement. Although Israeli leaders insist that their confrontation with Hezbollah is separate from their conflict with Iran, there is a realistic possibility that Iranian leaders will deepen their mistrust of both the US and Israel and see this as justification to sustain the war. For Iranian officials, this development has significantly undermined confidence in the ceasefire's stability.</p>	<p>Moderate</p>	
<p>Iran will likely continue pressing for a halt to Israeli operations against Hezbollah during the Islamabad talks, while the US will maintain that the Lebanon conflict is separate from the US-Iran-Israel dynamic. Although Iranian officials will still raise the issue, other topics, such as ending hostilities in Iran, reconstruction support, sanctions relief, and discussions on the Strait of Hormuz, are likely to dominate the agenda for both sides. If Iran judges the talks as unsuccessful, however, it may use the situation in Lebanon as justification to step back from negotiations.</p>	<p>Moderate</p>	

<p>Negotiations: Iranian officials are likely to be more willing to engage with JD Vance than with Witkoff or Kushner. Reports from mid-March indicated that Tehran preferred talks with Vance, viewing Kushner and Witkoff as tied to the previous failed negotiating round that preceded the outbreak of war in Iran on 28th February. Vance’s role as head of the US delegation in Islamabad signals Washington’s intention to reach a definitive resolution and increases Iranian openness to meaningful discussions, given their lower level of mistrust toward him.</p>	<p>Moderate</p>
<p>The absence of Israeli officials, while consistent with previous US-Iran negotiating rounds, is unlikely to be received positively by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Combined with reports that Israel was informed only at the “last minute” about the two-week ceasefire in Iran, Israeli officials are likely to feel sidelined in discussions over a conflict they view as central to their national security.</p>	<p>Low</p>
<p>The absence of Gulf countries at the Islamabad talks will not only frustrate Gulf leaders but is also likely to further strain their relationships with President Trump. Combined with reports that Gulf states received no advance warning about the launch of Operation Epic Fury or Israel’s Operation Roaring Lion, and then absorbed the bulk of Iran’s retaliation, Gulf leaders are likely to view this exclusion as unfavourable.</p>	<p>Low</p>
<p>Success of talks: It is highly unlikely that the Islamabad talks will deliver immediate success. Previous US–Iran negotiations have repeatedly broken down, contributing to both the Twelve-Day War in June 2025 and the conflict that began on 28th February. This precedent, combined with persistent gaps between US and Iranian demands and continued hostile rhetoric from officials on both sides, adds significant obstacles to any rapid progress.</p>	<p>High</p>
<p>If multiple rounds of US–Iran talks show signs of progress from both sides, an extension of the ceasefire will be more likely than a return to full-scale conflict. Mounting domestic pressure, strained regional relationships, the growing risk of miscalculation, and potential damage to critical infrastructure give both the US and Iran strong incentives to prioritise de-escalation over escalation. However, persistent incompatibilities between US and Iranian positions on the terms of a long-term cessation mean that a return to conflict remains a credible possibility.</p>	<p>Moderate</p>
<p>Iran’s uranium enrichment and the status of the Strait of Hormuz are likely to be among the most important and most contentious issues in US-Iran discussions. For the US and Israel, Iran’s enrichment activity continues to be viewed as evidence of an underlying intention to pursue nuclear weapons, making constraints on Iran’s nuclear stockpile a core requirement for any durable agreement. The Strait of Hormuz will also be a significant agenda item, though there is likely to be greater room for overlap between what the US and Iran are prepared to accept on this issue.</p>	<p>Moderate</p>
<p>Rhetorical signals and ongoing military posturing suggest that Iran, Israel, and the US all remain prepared and willing to resume kinetic operations. While much of this is likely intended as pressure during the two-week ceasefire, the sustained military readiness on all sides indicates that the probability of a return to full-scale conflict remains in the 40–50% range.</p>	<p>Moderate</p>

Forecasts will be made with greater confidence once the first round of talks in Islamabad concludes. The extent of any progress, the main points of contention, and each side's willingness to risk a return to full-scale conflict will almost certainly become clearer following the initial discussions.

High


There is a credible but low likelihood that the Islamabad talks will not proceed. Iranian officials continue to argue that Israeli strikes on Hezbollah constitute a ceasefire violation and have threatened to boycott upcoming talks until this condition is addressed. This makes non-attendance a realistic possibility. However, Tehran is still likely to judge it more advantageous to participate in at least the first round of negotiations.

Moderate

Attacks since ceasefire: The Iranian attacks that occurred after the ceasefire took effect are likely attributable either to hardline "rogue" elements within the IRGC or to residual strikes already queued in pre-planned attack cycles. This largely explains why the US, Israel, and Gulf states condemned the attacks but avoided treating them as major ceasefire violations that could derail negotiations. The US and Gulf countries were almost certainly aware that some Iranian fire

Moderate

Middle East Airspace Through 09/04 following the ceasefire announcement.




Airspace Closed
 Partial Closures/Airspace Avoidance
 Airspace Open

Despite some airspaces reopening, airspace avoidance persists as of 09/04
 Map: Healix GSOC • Created with Datawrapper

Casualties-Fatalities Linked To The Conflict Through 09/04

Casualties/Fatalities



As of 9th April (*Qatar fatalities due to helicopter crash and not Iranian attacks)

Map: Healix GSOC • Source: Reuters • Map data: © UNHCR • Created with Datawrapper

Reported Iranian Projectiles On 08/04 Towards Gulf Countries

Iranian projectiles on 08/04



**Some projectiles might have been launched prior to the ceasefire on 08/04. Not all projectiles have been reported in Qatar.*

Chart: Healix GSOC • Created with Datawrapper

Forecasting

Description

The regional security risk environment remains largely stable, but tensions persist in the run-up to the Islamabad talks. The US and Israel continue to refrain from strikes on Iran. While isolated or unauthorised Iranian strikes remain possible, Iran also refrains from any deliberate, large-scale attacks. Israel continues its operations in Lebanon, though at a reduced tempo compared with the escalation observed on 8th April.

Scenario Likelihood	Scenario Confidence	Scenario Timeframe	Concern Level	Risk Trend
Likely (55%-75%)	High	Coming 48 Hours	Major	Stable

Original Alert

Date / Time of Publication	Time Since Publication	Tags	Alert Level
9 April 2026 15:58	1 hour, 45 minutes	Conflict, MENA, Military Activity, Security	3

Description

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