

Rolling Situational Report

Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Gaza Strip, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank, Yemen - Regional: Continue to monitor dynamics linked to ongoing tensions and limited negotiating progress as of 14th May

Summary

BAHRAIN, CYPRUS, EGYPT, GAZA STRIP, IRAN, IRAQ, ISRAEL, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, OMAN, QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA, SYRIA, TURKEY, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, WEST BANK, YEMEN

Regional: Continue to monitor dynamics linked to ongoing tensions and limited negotiating progress as of 14th May. Continue to monitor dynamics in the MENA region as of 14th May. Both Iran and the US continue to enforce their respective blockades in the Strait of Hormuz, where limited maritime traffic - mostly in coordination with the IRGC Navy - continues to pass through. There are currently no indicators suggestive of a diplomatic breakthrough as US President Trump's state visit to China continues. The prospect of renewed US/Israeli strikes on Iran is likely to increase in the absence of progress in the coming weeks. Inbound travel to the region should account for the prospect of renewed conflict escalation.

Incident Status	Local Response Capacity	Last Analyst Update	Analyst Situational Confidence
Active	Some	2026-05-14 17:02 (GMT)	High

Update No.	Trend Rating	Themes/Tags	Incident Tempo
60	Stable	External Conflict, Unrest	Weekly (Thursday)

Developments

Description	Information Credibility	Source Reliability

<p>Ceasefire: The ceasefire remains in effect at the time of writing, despite the continued lack of progress between the US and Iranian positions. There has been no confirmed resumption of Iranian attacks against Gulf territory since the strikes on the UAE on 4th and 5th May. Both Iran and the US continue to maintain blockades in or near the Strait of Hormuz, with hostilities remaining concentrated along the waterway. Iranian officials affirm no military solution is viable.</p>	Confirmed true	Reliable
<p>The US White House announced on 14th May that China was in agreement with the US over Iran “never” acquiring a nuclear weapon; Chinese officials have not confirmed this at the time of writing. Trump said on 13th May that he also does not “think about Americans’ financial situation”, reiterating that the US’s top priority is preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.</p>	Confirmed true	Reliable
<p>Israel/Lebanon: The ceasefire in Lebanon remains in effect, despite the continuation of significant Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah also continues to target Israeli positions in south Lebanon, as well as launching projectiles toward northern Israel. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reported the ‘most significant’ Hezbollah attack since 2nd March, when the militant group launched multiple drones simultaneously at northern Israel. Israeli defences intercepted several drones over Lebanon, though some explosions were reported in Israel.</p>	Probably true	Usually reliable
<p>Lebanon and Israel have sent envoys to Washington for talks planned for 14th May, marking the third meeting since the collapse of the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah on 2nd March. Hezbollah continues to reject normalisation between Lebanon and Israel, while the Lebanese government maintains that no progress in talks is possible without an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon.</p>	Confirmed true	Reliable
<p>Strait of Hormuz: Roughly 30 vessels have transited the strait with authorisation from Iran since 13th May. Coinciding with US President Trump’s state visit to China, Iran’s semi-official news agency stated that Iran had begun allowing an increased number of Chinese vessels to transit the Strait. Several vessels linked to China have passed through the Strait since 13th May. At the same time, an Indian vessel was attacked off the coast of Limah, Oman, on 13th May, though all crew were safely evacuated.</p>	Probably true	Usually reliable
<p>Iran declared an expansion of its operational “scope” in the Strait of Hormuz, now reportedly extending from the coasts of Jask and Sirik to beyond Greater Tunb Island.</p>	Possibly true	Reliable
<p>The UK announced on 12th May that it would contribute to the multinational mission to de-mine the Strait of Hormuz once conditions allow. This follows reports that HMS <i>Dragon</i> is deploying to the Middle East.</p>	Confirmed true	Reliable

<p>The EU Energy Commissioner announced on 13th May that he did not expect a “very serious security of supply issue on a very short term”, but that a supply issue in the longer term could not be ruled out.</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Reliable</p>
<p>United Arab Emirates: During a BRICS meeting in Delhi, India, on 14th May, Iran’s foreign minister accused the UAE of direct involvement in US-Israeli coalition attacks on Iran, while also denouncing the UAE’s normalisation with Israel through the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020.</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Reliable</p>
<p>The UAE has accused 16 Lebanese nationals and five UAE-based organisations of having ties to the Hezbollah militant group and designated the entities on its Local Terrorist List.</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Reliable</p>
<p>Israel: The Israel National Cyber Directorate announced on 12th May that citizens had been receiving so-called “intimidation messages” on their telephones aimed at creating panic and undermining the sense of security. Israeli media reported that individuals had received messages, reportedly from Iranian authorities, threatening the resumption of missile and drone attacks against Israel.</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Reliable</p>
<p>Iran: The government announced on 12th May that the internet, which has remained in blackout for the 76th consecutive day, would “return to normal” once the war with the US and Israel ends. Local reports indicate that only government-approved sites are accessible without VPNs. The blackout continues to significantly constrain operational permissibility in Iran, with unverified reports suggesting that approximately 2 million individuals have lost their jobs.</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Usually reliable</p>
<p>Iranian officials have indicated that, in the event of a resumption of kinetic activity targeting Iran, they would escalate nuclear enrichment to 90%. The spokesperson for Iran’s parliamentary foreign policy and national security committee stated that the parliament would review such a move.</p>	<p>Possibly true</p>	<p>Usually reliable</p>
<p>Classified US intelligence assessments from early May reportedly indicate that Iran has regained access to the majority of its missile sites, launchers, and underground facilities. Iran has restored operational access to 30 of the 33 missile sites it maintains along the Strait of Hormuz. Only three missile sites along the Strait remain fully inaccessible, according to these assessments.</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Usually reliable</p>
<p>Iran is reported to retain approximately 70% of its mobile launcher fleet countrywide, as well as roughly 70% of its pre-war missile stockpile; these include both ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.</p>	<p>Probably true</p>	<p>Usually reliable</p>

<p>Gulf Attacks on Iran: Saudi Arabia is reported to have carried out more limited retaliatory actions compared to the UAE in the days leading up to the ceasefire signed on 8th April. The UAE reportedly carried out more extensive retaliation, including a strike on an oil refinery on Lavan Island in the Persian Gulf in early April. Kuwait is also reported to have conducted retaliatory strikes against Iranian-aligned militant positions in Iraq. The US reportedly supported the Emirati operation.</p>	Probably true	Usually reliable
<p>Kuwait: The Ministry of Interior announced on 12th May that four individuals accused of being members of Iran's IRGC were arrested aboard a fishing boat. Kuwaiti authorities allege that they were attempting to "infiltrate" Bubiyan Island. One Kuwaiti soldier was injured. The Iranian Foreign Ministry has denied the accusations.</p>	Probably true	Reliable
<p>The army announced that it detected and intercepted several "hostile drones" in its airspace in the early morning of 10th May. It remains unclear where the drones originated from.</p>	Probably true	Reliable

Assessments


Description	Confidence
<p>A deterioration in diplomatic engagement continues, as the second round of direct negotiations has not taken place. While Iran demands the lifting of the US naval blockade before any substantive engagement, the US refuses to lift the blockade on Iranian ports without progress on, or continued discussions regarding, Iran's nuclear programme. As Trump's trip to Beijing concludes with limited signs of a diplomatic breakthrough, the likelihood of renewed conflict is increasing, but is liable to change due to the nature of the actors involved.</p>	Moderate
<p>Both sides will likely continue seeking concessions from the other, in the short term, without returning to the pre-8th April conflict conditions in the region.</p>	Moderate
<p>Reports on 12th May of the US preparing to deploy amphibious assault ships to the CENTCOM area, alongside leaked intelligence indicating Iran has restored operational access to 30 of 33 missile sites along the Strait of Hormuz and reconstituted about 70% of its pre-war missile stockpile, underscore the military readiness being demonstrated by both sides.</p>	High
<p>Iranian officials are unlikely to make concessions or submit to US demands, due to their incompatibility with national policy requirements, as well as the recognition that compliance would carry with it a credible risk of reigniting civil unrest in Iran, as seen most recently in December 2025 - January 2026. This, in turn, would increase the likelihood of a domestic challenge to the current government or the governing structure.</p>	High
<p>Factors that may incentivise Trump to continue his economic coercion campaign rather than relaunch a full-scale war include the upcoming FIFA World Cup commencing on 11th June, as well as assessments that a full-scale military campaign is unlikely to produce a significantly different outcome to that observed following the June 2025 war and the current ceasefire period.</p>	Moderate

<p>In the near term, Trump is likely to continue employing rhetorical escalation and economic pressure as coercive tools to compel Iranian concessions. Trump is expected to persist with this approach and, only once he assesses that it has been exhausted, consider a return to conducting attacks against Iran.</p>	<p>High</p>
<p>Both sides are expected to retain the capacity for limited military escalation, using the prospect of renewed exchanges as a bargaining tool in negotiations. The US retains the option of contained strikes against tactical Iranian targets to push Iranian negotiators to make concessions without relaunching a military operation. Iran could target critical Gulf infrastructure to signal that it retains credible strike capabilities should the conflict resume. Such an Iranian attack would likely remain contained in both scale and intensity so as not to provoke a US response.</p>	<p>Moderate</p>
<p>The regional airspace will fluctuate depending on external conflict risks and developments. While the UAE lifted its “temporary and partial closure” of its airspace on 3rd May, the resumption of Iranian kinetic activity targeting the country led to NOTMAs being issued, restricting flights along several routes until 11th May. Any resumption of kinetic activity will therefore prompt rapid airspace closures across the wider Gulf.</p>	<p>High</p>

Imagery and Mapping

Middle East Airspace Through 14/05






Airspace Closed
 Partial Closures/Airspace Avoidance
 Airspace Open

Despite some airspaces reopening, airspace avoidance persists (not all related Iran conflict)


Map: Healix GSOC • Created with Datawrapper

Strike Quantities Launched Towards Regional Countries As Of 10/05



*Data based on the most recent reports (28/02 - 10/05). Graph excludes Iraq.
 Chart: Healix GSOC • Created with Datawrapper

Iranian Strike Locations



★ Confirmed Strike Locations
 GCC Countries
 Iran & Israel

Non-exhaustive list of confirmed strike locations, including falling debris and direct hits// Strikes from Iran, Iranian-aligned proxies, and US-Israel coalition
 Map: Healix GSOC • Created with Datawrapper

Forecasting

Description

President Trump continues to push for a diplomatic resolution that meets US demands, rather than a return to full-scale war in Iran. Following his state visit to China, he is incentivised to continue back-channel shuttle diplomacy, alongside deliberate kinetic escalation in the Strait of Hormuz to pressure Iran into making concessions. Iranian officials, viewing US demands as incompatible with domestic priorities, maintain hardline positions. Tensions between US and Iranian officials increase despite ongoing external diplomatic efforts.

Scenario Likelihood	Scenario Confidence	Scenario Timeframe	Concern Level	Risk Trend
Likely (55%-75%)	Moderate	Coming Week	Major	Stable

Original Alert

Date / Time of Publication	Time Since Publication	Tags	Alert Level
14 May 2026 15:30	1 hour, 31 minutes	Conflict, MENA, Military Activity, Security	3

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